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They pull into a dimly lit cul-de-sac; he gently turns off the engine.
They are completely alone. She has not seen him before, but he does not
seem nervous. Still, when he asks herjust how much it costs, she does not
answer just yet. Slowly she begins to unzip his pants and begins to fondle
his genitals. As she begins to lean down, he puts his hand on her shoulder
and abruptly stops her.
The above scene may make some very uncomfortable: the
vulnerability of the couple parked on a dark side street, the sexual subject
matter, or nature of the transaction. Why did he stop?' Two seconds after
the story ended, he tells her he is a police officer and places her under
arrest for prostitution.2 Now he can do up his pants. A marked police car
rounds the bend and she is placed in the backseat in hand cuffs and brought
to the local county jail.
L Introduction
A recent news article offers a rare public expos6 of a case where on
multiple occasions during the course of a prostitution investigation a
civilian volunteer, under the supervision of law enforcement, engaged in
sexual intercourse with suspected sex workers.3 In Lehigh County,
Pennsylvania, a civilian man volunteered to go undercover to investigate an
* Washington and Lee University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009; George
Washington University, B.S. 2005.
1. Of note, this paper focuses on the stereotype of the female sex worker. While it is
beyond the scope of the paper to address this issue, a discussion of the prevalence of sexual
contact between law enforcement officers and male sex workers might enrich the analysis.
2. The implications of word choice are very important, especially in this context
where certain words may have a long history of negative connotations or where word choice
in itself serves as a way of framing arguments to serve an ultimate conclusion. For example,
using the term "sex work" for some is inappropriate because it indicates that the activity is a
trade or profession. Yet, alternatively, the term "prostitute" has a long history of negative
connotations and creates an identity of "prostitute." Similarly, there is a question of which
term is appropriate: "john," "client" or "customer." In this paper both the terms "sex
worker" and "prostitute" will be used. In general "prostitute" or "prostitution" will be used
in reference to the criminal laws and/or historical contexts where the term's connotations
have a relevant expressive value.
3. See Debbie Garlicki, Police Work in Prostitution Sting Rubs Defense Attorney the
Wrong Way, THE MORNING CALL, Sept. 18, 2007, at Al (reporting about a case in which a
civilian informant was allegedly paid by local law enforcement to have sex with suspected
sex workers). The Defense filed a motion to have the case dismissed on the theory that law
enforcement's undercover investigation tactic violated the Due Process Clause. Id. The
Defense largely relied on an expert witness who testified about the emotional and
psychological impacts of this type of investigatory tactic on sex workers. Id.
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alleged sex parlor.4 During the course of the investigation the civilian agent
paid for and engaged in sexual intercourse with multiple women who
worked at the massage parlor.5 During these encounters the civilian agent
6consented to wear a wiretap in his pants. From a nearby location law
enforcement officers were thus able to listen to these encounters as they
unfolded.7 Although he volunteered for the task, the civilian agent was
reportedly paid $40 by local law enforcement for each of his engagements. 8
The women with whom he had sex were ultimately charged with
prostitution.9
Despite the deep and perplexing implications of when a government
uses its power to engage in sexual relations in the context of undercover
prostitution stings, the investigatory practice described above has gone
largely unchallenged in academic literature-particularly in feminist legal
circles.' 0 Yet in the last ten years, a plethora of news articles across the
country have reported cases where sexual contact occurred during







10. A few scholars have previously written on related topics or have addressed this
topic more generally. See generally, Susan S. Kuo, Official Indiscretions: Considering Sex
Bargains With Government Informants, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1643, 1648 (2005) (Kuo's
Article "addresses the practice of requiring an informant to engage in sex activities with
another individual for the purpose of furthering criminal law enforcement goals"); Gary T.
Marx, Under-the-Covers Undercover Investigations: Some Reflections on the State's Use of
Sex & Deception in Law Enforcement, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHics 13, 14-17 (1992) (discussing
the use of sex in undercover prostitution sting operations). Marx argues that using deception
to sell sex when investigating prostitution is not "ethically very disturbing." Id. at 15.
However, Marx notes that when there is actual consummation of the acts then the
government behavior becomes increasingly objectionable. Id. at 16.
11. See, e.g., Luke Turf, Glendale Prostitution Sting Has Fringe Benefits, WESTWARD
NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.westword.com/2007-11-08/news/glendale-
prostitution-sting-has-fringe-benefits/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (describing a prostitution
sting in which a police officer allowed a suspect to put a condom on his penis and then slap
his penis before making an arrest). The case caused further controversy in that the police
officer allegedly asked fellow officers to remove the reference "began oral stimulation" from
their notes. Id.; Daniel Patrick Sheehan & Arlene Martinez, Must Sex Be a Part of Sex
Stings, THE MORNING CALL, Sept. 23, 2007, at BI (providing a sample of States where law
enforcement officers are allowed to have sexual contact during prostitution stings); Scott
Gutierrez, Seattle Vice: Going Too Far? When Undercover Officers Buy Lap Dances or
Fondle Performers at Strip Clubs, Some Say They're 'Partying on the Public Dollar'-&
15 WASH. & LEE L. J C. R. AND SOC. JUST. 453 (2009)
significance and implications of this sexual contact. Ultimately, the goal is
not to propose a legal strategy or theory upon which to analyze this
relationship, but rather to demand an accounting of and interrogation of this
investigatory practice.
Admittedly this analysis is not complete. For one, there are certain
Fourth Amendment issues that come into play. Additionally, there is a
more pragmatic approach where one balances the cost benefits of
government intrusion and crime prevention. This aspect is certainly
important when one considers that some individuals are forced into
prostitution. Each of these and other aspects requires a fuller discussion
Perhaps Breaking the Law, THE SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 11, 2007, at Al
(reporting cases in which undercover officers at times touched women's breasts and butts
while receiving lap dances). One officer even undid his belt and allowed his genitals to be
fondled over his underwear. Id.; Tom Jackman, Spotsylvania Deputies Receive Sex Services
in Prostitution Cases, WASH. POST., Feb. 13, 2006, at B01 (describing how on at least four
occasions detectives received sexual services in exchange for money as part of a prostitution
sting); Jennifer Sullivan & Christopher Schwarzen, Did Local Vice Cops Cross the Line?,
THE SEATTLE-TIMES, October 7, 2005, at 1A (discussing an investigation where undercover
officers were masturbated by suspects-intercourse was prohibited); Ian Demsky, Police
Defend Prostitution Tactic, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 2, 2005, http://tennessean.com/loca/archives/
05/01/65061449.shtnil (last visited April 11, 2008) ("[P]olice spent almost $120,000 over a
three-year period to foster encounters, mostly skin-on-skin, between confidential informants
and prostitutes in an effort to further Nashville's crackdown on the illicit sex trade.")(on file
with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Shannon Colavecchio-
Van Sickler & Christopher Goffard, How Far is Too Far for the Sex Cops?, ST.
PETERSBURG-TIMES, July 31, 2004, at 1A (reporting on a case where two sheriffs listened in
from a nearby motel room while an informant received oral sex from a suspect). In the same
County, only a month before, an officer testified in court that "[w]e don't penetrate. That's
basically about it." Id; Jason Riley, Undercover Methods Draw Ridicule, Praise, THE
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ken.), July 4, 2004, at 4S (reporting that prior to 2002, when
the prosecutor's office requested the practice end, Louiseville police records indicated that
sexual contact had occurred in 31 or 64 massage parlor arrests); Kim Smith, Sex Sting Went
Too Far, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, June 15, 2004, http://www.eastvalley
tribune.com/story/23 162 (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) (reporting a case where the
prosecutor's office declined to prosecute nearly 60 women charged with prostitution because
the officers went too far-undressing, touching women's breasts and genitals, and even
beginning oral sex) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
Many law enforcement agencies prohibit this type of sexual interaction or at least require
that the physical contact be extremely minimal. See, e.g., Stan Oklobdzija, Sex Sting Snares
Women: Five Prostitution Suspects Arrested as Officer Plays 'John,' SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 9, 2007, at Gl (quoting an undercover officer who states that physical contact with the
suspect must be "brief and light so that the District Attorney won't have any qualms about
going forward with the case"); Tom Jackman, Spotsylvania Deputies Receive Sex Services
in Prostitution Cases, WASH. POST., Feb. 13, 2006, at BO (quoting an Alexandria, Virginia
police spokeswoman who stated that detectives were permitted to disrobe, but that the arrest
would happen before the sex worker got to the agent's "personal area").
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than the one provided here. The overall aim of this Note is to call for such
discussions so that the described encounters are no longer merely an
occasional headline in a newspaper that raises eyebrows, but rather
something that has been scrutinized and considered.
Through this Note I hope to start this dialogue by positing that the
police tactic described above should not be taken at its face value, but rather
scrutinized as a broader reflection of the government's policy towards
treating sex workers. Indeed, the very existence of this police tactic
requires the involvement of all three branches of government. Part II of this
Note begins from this basis.
Part II begins by describing how each branch of government enables,
participates in, or promotes law enforcement to engage in sexual acts with
suspected sex workers. It begins by discussing the rationales for the
criminalization of prostitution--emphasizing how gender, racial, ethnic,
and national origin biases have influenced the criminalization of sex work.
It then focuses on how the criminalization of prostitution implicitly requires
that law enforcement becomes intertwined in the crime as part of its
investigations, noting the inherent potential for abuse in law enforcement's
investigations of sex crimes and the disproportionate manner in which the
law is enforced. Next, Part II asserts that the judiciary has totally failed to
redress or even to adequately engage in a discussion about the serious
implications of this type of investigatory tactic.
Part III then addresses the proper role of the government and considers
that in this case the government has failed to check itself. This Part serves
as a challenge for members of each branch of government to more fully
consider its role not as an individual branch, but rather as part of a
functioning unit. By not taking this broader approach, the three-
government parts have thus far been able to avoid these more difficult
questions. Finally, the Note concludes with an urging for commentators to
move beyond a dialogue that only includes a victim-agency analysis. This
type of analysis cannot result in a satisfactory answer on either count.
1H. The Government Sex Trio
The three branches of government act in concert enabling the
government to become the sexual partner of suspected sex workers. The
work of three: (1) the Legislature forbids the woman from selling her
sexual services; (2) law enforcement engages in sexual acts to investigate
and enforce the legislated crime; and (3) a criminal court penalizes the
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accused for offering his or her services to law enforcement. This Part
addresses how each of these branches together creates the government as a
sexual partner.
A. Legislature As A Sex Partner: The Government Does Not Ask What You
Want, But Instead Tells You What You Cannot Do
The impetus for the creation of the government as a sex partner rests in
the American legislatures' choice to confront prostitution through the
criminal law. Criminalization sets apart sex for money from other forms of
"legitimate" sex-such as sex within the confines of marriage. 12  By
delineating between legal and illegal forms of sex the government expresses
a moral stance as to the legitimacy of certain sexual encounters. In doing
so, the government begins its insertion into the sexual lives of Americans.
i. The Legislative Branch: The Historical Backdrop of the Crime of
Prostitution
Prior to the Progressive Era, prostitution was rarely a separate criminal
offense.' 3 The first laws criminalizing prostitution responded to a variety of
concerns, but each of these concerns either directly or indirectly related to
12. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 146 (1995) ("In law, marriage
traditionally has been designated as the only legitimate sexual relationship."); see also Mary
Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1045, 1058-059 (1992) ("'[L]egal' sexual autonomy is conventionally extended to
women only by rules that locate sexuality in marriage or by rules that allow women
decisional autonomy regarding reproductive issues .... "). The Supreme Court's ruling in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) arguably expands some of these legal protections to
outside a traditional marriage context. It is not, however, within the scope of the paper to
fully address these implications.
13. See Ann M. Lucas, Race Class, Gender and Deviancy: The Criminalization of
Prostitution, 10 BERK. W. L. J. 47, 51 (1995) ("By the Progressive Era, prostitution had
come to be seen and treated as an independent criminal offense."). Prior to the Progressive
Era, prostitutes were generally "tolerated," and if they were ever subject to criminal penalties
it was not for a specific prostitution offense, but rather through laws against vagrancy, night
walking or disturbing the peace. Id. at 50; see also BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY
VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN REFORM TRADITION 32-33
(rev. ed. 1990) (noting that in the nineteenth century, because prostitution itself was not
specifically criminalized, if sex workers were arrested it was generally for violating a
general public nuisance law).
458
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the desire to regulate women's sexuality. 14 The structure of the criminal
statutes demonstrates legislatures' focus on women's sexuality. First, early
statutes defined prostitution not only as sex for sale, but also sexual
promiscuity without regard to whether the sexual acts were for monetary
gain.15 For example, in 1908 in United States v. Bitty,16 the Supreme Court
described prostitution as "women who, for hire or without hire, offer their
bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with men."'17 As late as 1983, North
Carolina's criminal statute defined prostitution as
the offering or receiving of the body for sexual intercourse for hire, and
shall also be construed to include the offering or receiving of the body
for indiscriminate sexual intercourse without hire.'
8
Moreover, these laws were largely aimed exclusively at women. 19 For
example, the exclusion of men from the statutes, and the inclusion of simple
14. See Ann M. Lucas, supra note 13, at 51-58 (describing the factors that led to the
criminalization of prostitution during the Progressive Era). Lucas points out four factors
which led to the criminalization of prostitution. 1. The continued accepted view that a
prostitute was a "fallen woman" capable all sorts of criminal conduct. 2. The belief that
prostitution embodied the very root evils of industrialization and capitalism. Capitalism was
associated with reduced civic and sexual virtue; industrialization was associated with the
breakdown of the family unit. 3. The growing spread of sexually transmitted diseases and
their association with moral decay. 4. The association of deviancy with poverty. In
particular working-class, immigrant and non-white women were associated with sexual
deviancy. Id.; see also Charles H. Whitebread, "Us" and "Them" and the Nature of Moral
Regulation, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 361, 366-68 (1999) (describing how fears of the moral decay
associated with urbanization and industrialization, combined with prejudices against a
ethnically and racially diverse lower class, led to an organized movement to repress
prostitution). A general belief carrying over from the Victorian era held that if a woman
had crossed the line from chaste to unchaste, that not only would she be ostracized in
society, but she had ruined her very self in that she had forever tainted her moral compass.
Thus, it was imperative not only to protect but to prevent delicate women from losing their
chastity. See BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, supra note 13, at 110 (describing how a deviant
sexual history was associated with a general criminal tendency).
15. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 300 S.E.2d 379, 380 (1983) (quoting the statutory
definition, noting that prostitution includes, "the offering or receiving of the body for
indiscriminate sexual intercourse without hire"); State v. Poague, 72 N.W.2d 620, 623
(Minn. 1955) (discussing the meaning of the ordinance which defined prostitution as
"'indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men"'); State v. Clark, 43 N.W. 273, 273 (Iowa
1889) ("[W]e think if a woman submits to indiscriminate sexual intercourse, which she
invites or solicits by word or act, or any device, she is a prostitute."). Certainly pecuniary
gain may serve as evidence of the indiscriminate nature of the sexual relations, but these
statutes did not require that such compensation occurred or be a part of the encounter.
16. 208 U.S. 393 (1908).
17. Id. at 401.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-203 (West 1983) (emphasis added).
19. Today such a gendered construction would not pass an Equal Protection challenge.
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promiscuity, demonstrates that the early laws were geared specifically at
controlling women's sexuality.2°
The criminalization of prostitution is intimately tied to notions of
class, race, ethnicity, and national origin.21 Prejudices against women of
color influenced the movement to criminalize prostitution in two related
manners. First, at the turn of the nineteenth century women of color were
thought to be inherently promiscuous. 22  The growing urbanization and
increased interactions of people of different races within cities was thought
to pose a potential threat to whites.23 Second, at this same time, a growing
number of Americans were becoming increasingly concerned that "white
women" were being trafficked into sexual slavery.24 This led to the passage
See, e.g., Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966, 969 (1979) (holding that the exclusion of men in the
definition of prostitution violated the Alaskan constitution's Equal Protection Clause).
20. See David A. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral
Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1204-06
("[T]hese twin omissions [gender neutrality and commercial requirement] suggest that the
traditional concern for prostitution was peculiarly associated with female sexuality-more
particularly, with attitudes towards promiscuous unchastity in women-apart from any
commercial aspects."); see also Ann M. Lucas, supra note 13, at 58-59 (noting that during
the Progressive Era some equated promiscuity even without the commercial aspect to
prostitution and thus desired its criminalization to stigmatize those engaging in illicit sex
generally).
21. For an interesting discussion about the construction of the influence of race and
gender in the creation of the prostitute identity, see Tanya Kateri Hemndez, Sexual
Harassment and Racial Disparity: The Mutual Construction of Gender and Race, 4 J. GEN.,
RACE & JUSTICE 183, 197-99 (2001). Hernandez argues that gender is created through a
prostitute paradigm that depicts "women of color as the quintessential prostitute." Id. at 212.
Other commentators have discussed the intimate linkage of prostitution and slavery. See
Vednita Carter & Evelina Giobbe, Duet: Prostitution, Racism and Feminist Discourse, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 42 (1999) (discussing the linkage of racism, sexual abuse and
slavery); Celine Perrefias Shimizu, Queen of Anal, Double, Triple, and the Gang Bang:
Producing Asian/American Feminism in Pornography, 18 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 235, 239-
41 (2006) (discussing the link between sex work and the racialization of Asian women's
sexual identity).
22. See JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 86-87 (1988) (noting that people of color were considered
inherently promiscuous thereby justifying the necessity of controlling their behavior so as
not to pollute moral supremacy of the white's sexual customs). Not coincidentally, laws
against prostitution were generally enforced more often against women of color. Id. at 136-
37 (describing this disproportionate arrest rate of black sex workers in the postbellum
South).
23. See Whitebread, supra note 14, at 366-68 (1999) (describing the related
connection between urbanization and the fears of the degradation of the "respectable
classes").
24. JOHN F. DECKER, PROSTrruTION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 69 (1979).
The... most important reason for the crackdown of prostitution was the
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of a rash of laws in the early nineteenth century specifically directed
towards ending "white slavery.',21 Criminalizing prostitution could meet
two ends: it could prevent the pollution of "American" values as well as
prevent white women from being trafficked into prostitution. The
criminalization of prostitution is tainted, if not wholly poisoned, with a
history embedded with discrimination against women, particularly women
from racial and ethnic minorities.
ii. Contemporary Rationales for Criminalization
Today laws criminalizing prostitution apply to both sexes2 6 and do not
include the sexual conduct that does not have a commercial aspect.27 Thus,
the phrase, "prostitution is the oldest profession in the world," makes more
sense generally today because contemporary laws only criminalize sexual
interactions that include a financial transaction.28 As the laws against sex
work have evolved and changed, so to have the justifications for its
criminalization.
One predominant rationalization for the criminalization of prostitution
is that prostitution is not a valid type of work or labor.29 Generally, it is
allegation that an extensive degree of 'organized trafficking' in 'white slavery'
existed on the continent and between other continents and North America.... It
was assumed that most of this traffic was for the purpose of maintaining a ready
supply of meretricious women for the brothel-keepers.
Id.
25. Id. at 71 (highlighting the fact that many of these statutes specifically had "White
Slavery" as a part of their official title).
26. For example, laws criminalizing prostitution are now gender neutral on their face.
See, e.g., M.G.L.A. 272 § 53A(a) ("Whoever engages, agrees to engage, or offers to engage
in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee[] .... "). A criminal definition that
included only women as potential offenders would surely violate Equal Protections. See,
e.g., Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966, 969 (1979) (holding that the exclusion of men in the
definition of prostitution violated the Alaskan constitution's Equal Protection Clause).
27. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-203 (2005) (defining prostitution to include
indiscriminate sex without a commercial aspect). "The term 'prostitution' shall ... be
construed to include the offering or receiving of the body for indiscriminate sexual
intercourse without hire." Id. Although beyond the scope of this Note, it seems as though
this inclusion in the definition, criminalizing indiscriminate non-commercial consensual
sexual acts, might run afoul to the underlying holding in Lawrence v. Texas. See Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 578-79 (holding that a Texas statute making sodomy illegal violated Due
Process and thus was unconstitutional).
28. But see infra notes 31-32 (setting out commentators' arguments as to why it is
fundamentally flawed to consider prostitution a profession).
29. See Kuo, supra note 10, at 1662-67 (laying out the opposing arguments whether
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argued, that prostitution can be separated from other types of labor in two
ways. First, some argue that sex is intimately linked to personhood and
therefore ought to be market inalienable. 30 Just as one cannot sell oneself,
neither can a person sell his or her own sexual favors.3 ' Second, others
argue that in a patriarchal society one cannot legitimately consent to enter
into prostitution.32 Third, even if prostitution is seen as a form of labor,
various reasons may exist as to why the work itself should not be treated as
other types of work. These rationales are more generally concerned with
the actual or perceived circumstances that surround prostitution, i.e., drug
abuse, sexual violence, sexual trafficking and the spread of disease.33
or not sex work posses any unique characteristics that justify its being treated differently
than other types of work). See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, "Whether From Reason or
Prejudice": Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 693, 702 (1998)
(discussing the many ways in which sex work differs from or is similar to other types of
labor).
30. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1699, 1699-700 (1990) ("The threat to personhood from commodification arises because
essential attributes are treated as severable and fungible objects, and this denies the integrity
and uniqueness of self."). But see David A. Richards, Commercial Sex and the Rights of the
Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1195, 1257-58 (1979) (arguing commercial sex does not constitute the sale of the body, but
rather a personal service).
31. For example, some commentators vehemently argue that prostitution is no more a
form of legitimate work than slavery itself. See, e.g., Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol & Jane E.
Larson, Sexual Labor and Human Rights, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 391, 418 (2006)
(noting that "classical liberal political thinkers consistently rejected the idea that one could
sell oneself into slavery").
32. See Kuo, supra note 10, at 1669-70 (laying out some commentator's arguments
that commercial sex is illegitimate because it lacks consent). Many of these arguments are
based in dominance theory. See NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, A PRIMER:
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 22-26 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2006) (summarizing the general premise
of dominance theory). "[D]ominance theory [or radical feminism] focuses on the power
relations between men and women.... This theory says that men are privileged and women
are subordinated, and this male privilege receives support from most social institutions, as
well as a complex system of cultural beliefs." Id. at 22-23. With this societal framework in
mind it is easy to argue that prostitution would then necessarily involve subordination that
limits the possibility for consent. See CATHERINE MAcKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES MEN'S
LAWS 151 (2005). MacKinnon states:
Women in prostitution are denied every imaginable civil right in every
imaginable and unimaginable way, [footnote omitted] such that it makes sense
to understand prostitution as consisting of the denial of women's humanity, no
matter how humanity is defined.... Women are prostituted precisely in order
to be degraded and subjected to cruel and brutal treatment without human limits.
Id.
33. Margret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminism, 5 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 47, 97-99 (1992) (discussing the "conventional" justifications for criminalizing
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iii. Embroiling the State
Once the legislature has criminalized prostitution, the next obvious
consideration is how to enforce the laws. This poses a precarious question
because on the one hand in criminalizing prostitution, the legislature is
expressing that sex cannot be sold.34 On the other hand, given the private
and intimate settings in which the crime occurs, one can logically assume
that to enforce the crime, law enforcement ultimately must embroil itself in
the crime. As one commentator noted, ...... as long as these laws are on the
books, the substance of the violation (and its consensual and secret
structure) practically requires a degree of participation by the state.
'' 5
This requirement undercuts the very basis for criminalizing prostitution-
the idea that sex is somehow sacred and must be protected.36
B. Executive Investigation & Enforcement
"They enter the massage parlors as undercover detectives. They leave
as satisfied customers."
3 7
Having outlined the relevant concerns regarding the motivations
behind the criminalization of prostitution, this section now turns to the
equally troubling tactics used to enforce the laws criminalizing prostitution.
The enforcement of the crime of prostitution is troubling for at least two
reasons: (1) the enforcement creates a situation in which the investigation
imparts the same "harm" as the crime; and (2) the same discriminatory
motivations attendant to the criminalization of prostitution are often equally
as present in the enforcement of the laws. Further, both these concerns
prostitution). Baldwin explains:
Those justifications include the control of venereal disease; the inhibition of
other crimes related to prostitution, including theft, assault, and drug use; the
protection of girls and women in prostitution; and the suppression of "public
offense" caused by prostitution, taking either the form of neighborhood
disruption or moral outrage.
Id. at 98.
34. See Radin, supra note 30, at 1699-700 (1990) (arguing that the commodification
of sex services poses a threat to personhood).
35. Marx, supra note 10, at 15.
36. See id. ("In enforcing such statutes the government engages in moral partisanship
regarding the disputed relationship between sex and friendship/love. It hypocritically
combats the separation it opposes through enforcement means that appear to further it.").
37. Tom Jackman, Spotsylvania Deputies Receive Sex Services in Prostitution Cases,
WASH. POST., Feb. 13, 2006, at B01.
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ultimately lead to the overall diminished public trust in the legitimacy of
law enforcement.
i. What a Legitimate Investigation Requires
Sexual contact should not be necessary in order for a police officer to
make an arrest for prostitution. Criminal statutes technically bar
solicitation to engage in prostitution. The mere offering to provide sexual
services for a price constitutes a crime. For example, to violate the
Massachusetts law against prostitution, one need only ".... agree[] to
engage, or offer[]to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return
for a fee ... whether such sexual conduct occurs or not. 38 Physical contact
is not necessary to commit the underlying offense.
Countering this argument, law enforcement often contends that
suspects are generally suspicious that potential clients are undercover law
enforcement. Thus, the prostitutes will often require that potential clients
initiate physical contact before an agreement is made.39 Or alternatively,
law enforcement may argue that physical contact is necessary in order to
elevate the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony.
When law enforcement officers do engage in sexual contact serious
legitimacy questions arise. First, there is a question about the relative
balance of the government intrusion versus individual autonomy.40 The
balance is especially skewed when considering the crime is generally only a
misdemeanor 4' and yet the investigation required for its enforcement
38. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. CH. 272 § 53(a) (West 2009).
39. See, e.g., State v. Artishon, 2002 WL 172029 at *1 (Minn. App. 2002)
(unpublished) (describing how the suspect refused to discuss a sexual bargain until the
undercover officer touched her breasts to prove he was not a law enforcement officer).
When the officer pulled his car to the curb, Artishon opened the front passenger
door and asked the officer if he was a 'cop.' The officer said that he was not a
cop, and Artishon got into the vehicle. After they had gone a short distance,
during which Artishon continued to look for police, Artishon asked the officer to
prove he was not a police officer by touching her bare breasts. The officer
complied, and Artishon offered to perform oral sex in exchange for $25.
Id.
40. This argument has been raised generally about the enforcement of "victimless
crimes." See Kent Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 671, 680-81 (1999) (discussing how victimless crimes raise questions about
the balance of the government intrusion and individual autonomy).
41. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.2 (2001) (categorizing prostitution as a petty
misdemeanor).
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involves serious intrusions into intimate personal matters. Second, by
engaging in the sexual acts that the law prohibits, law enforcement officers
are taking part in a crime that, but for their status, they could not legally
commit. Law enforcement officers are literally engaging in financial
transactions for sex.42 When law enforcement engages in this act, one of
the societal harms that the legislature seeks to prevent-perversion of
sexual activity-has already occurred. Third, a law enforcement officer's
deception requires a betrayal of a suspect's body.43 The very nature of the
type of investigation is ripe for abuse of powers.
ii. Abuse & Unequal Enforcement
Undercover operations provide law enforcement with increased
opportunities and temptations to engage in unethical police conduct.
44
Prostitution sting operations in particular provide law enforcement officers
with tempting opportunities to abuse sex workers. 45 The investigations are
often secret; the sex worker and the undercover officer are generally the
sole witnesses to the physical and verbal interactions. In these vulnerable
and isolating circumstances, law enforcement officers, generally males,
42. Some, though, may not see this as engaging in a financial transaction so much as it
is a "theft of services," because the sex worker is never paid for his or her service. See
Marx, supra note 10, at 16 ("There is a theft of services and a terrible imbalance or lack of
reciprocity that is not found with most undercover encounters.").
43. Id. ("Betrayal involving another's body adds an additional troubling element,
beyond that occurring with the mere exchange of tangible objects or the failure to keep a
promise.").
44. This risk is very powerful given the fact that the investigation is undercover. See
Gary T. Marx, Who Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the New Police Undercover
Work, in ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 65, 77-
80 (The Police Found. 1983) (discussing the particular risks and heightened temptation for
undercover law enforcement officers to abuse their position). Marx points out many factors
that add to the pronounced pressures in undercover investigations, including: increased
physical dangers; more autonomy in unpredictable situations; increased physical and
financial risks for department and individual officers; increased exposure and personal
relationships with criminals; isolation from professional peers; more opportunities for police
corruption. Id. On the other hand, undercover investigations are often governed by internal
agency guidelines. See Henry Hamilton & John SmykIa, Undercover Guidelines, 11
JUSTICE QUARTERLY 1, Mar. 1994 (discussing law enforcement agencies guidelines
regulating the use of undercover investigations).
45. This type of undercover investigation has long been associated with police
corruption and misconduct. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 328-31 (1968) (discussing the corruption and abuse in vice units using
undercover officers and decoys to solicit prostitutes).
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may have a more physically threatening presence. These opportunities
may lead to situations in which law enforcement officers take advantage of
the secret and intimate nature of their investigation and abuse their
authority.
Moreover, the domineering culture and practices in some law
enforcement agencies contribute, in part, to a culture where abuse of the
situation is more likely to occur. In some sense, officers require this
domineering presence in order to show their authority in often physically
dangerous and vulnerable situations. However, officers are not simply
associated with an authoritative and protecting presence; they are also
associated with "hypermasculine" behavior.46  This "hypermasculine"
behavior is a part of a culture that often emphasizes domination and
subordination-the same culture often associated with officer misconduct.47
The sexual encounter between a law enforcement officer and a
suspected prostitute may serve as a manifestation of the domination of the
officer over the subject.48 The very nature of the sexual context is one in
which the sex worker is a "subject" and the officer represents the full power
of the government.
These sexual encounters cannot simply be separated from this
surrounding culture. The encounters do not occur in a vacuum, but rather
take place within a culture where law enforcement is expected to be
domineering and where sex workers are often regarded with little respect.49
46. See Angela P. Harris, Gender Violence, Race and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 777, 793 (describing the common association of law enforcement with
"hypermasculinity"). Harris defines "hypermasculinity" as "a masculinity in which the
strictures against femininity and homosexuality are especially intense and in which physical
strength and aggressiveness are paramount." Id.
47. See Mary Ellen Gale, Calling in the Girl Scouts: Feminist Legal Theory and
Police Misconduct, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 691, 698 (2001).
Studies of the police culture that perpetuates the paramilitary mythology of
police work show that police misconduct is tightly linked to, if not directly
caused by, stereotypic, aggressive, rampant masculinity-at its worst a naked
celebration of the legal and physical power to subdue, subordinate, and
dehumanize the people who become the targets of law enforcement.
Id.; see also, Harris, supra note 46, at 793-99 (describing the "hypermasculine" culture of
law enforcement and how this relates to police brutality). Harris further notes that "[i]n a
sense, the police officer is expected to be the mirror image of the paradigmatic criminal, the
violent thug who threatens the lives and safety of innocent citizens." Id. at 793.
48. See Gale, supra note 47, at 698 (describing the potential for officer's to use their
authority and physical presence to subordinate suspects).
49. See Harris, supra note 46, at 796-97. (describing how police abuses are "not
random," but rather they "follow[] the vectors of power established in the larger society in
which white dominates nonwhite and rich dominates poor").
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Given the circumstances surrounding the situation, it is not surprising then
that there are many reports of cases in which a law enforcement officer has
abused a sex worker during the course of a sting operation.50 A "freebie,"
when an officer receives sexual service at no cost, is a typical way in which
law enforcement might take advantage of a sex worker.5'
Additionally, certain groups or segments of the population are more
regularly arrested for prostitution.52 For example, "poor, minority women
are disproportionately often the target of arrest and harsh treatment."53 In
1992, approximately forty percent of those arrested for prostitution were
African Americans; however, African Americans comprised only twelve
percent of the population of female prostitutes. 54 This disproportionate
50. Evidence of this abuse comes from testimony from both sex workers and law
enforcement officers. In some cases official investigations and formal charges have resulted.
See, e.g., Carol Leigh, A First Hand Look at the San Francisco Task Force Report on
Prostitution, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 81 n.63 (1999) (discussing the testimony of sex
workers in San Francisco describing police abuse); Norma Jean Almodavor, For Their Own
Good. The Results of Prostitution Laws as Enforced by Cops, Politicians, and Judges, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 120-21 (1999) (quoting an officer describing how law
enforcement officers will sometimes get "freebies" from prostitutes in exchange for not
arresting them); Josh Kovner, Officers Accused of Misconduct: Prostitutes' Allegations
Prompt Investigation, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Oct. 1, 1998, at BI (reporting an
investigation into widespread Hartford police practices of assaulting and extorting sex from
prostitutes); David Kocieniewski & John Sullivan, Newark Police Troubled: Out of Control
at the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at Al (documenting police rape, robbery, and beating
of prostitutes that went undisciplined). Additionally, at the annual American Economic
Association two economists from the University of Chicago suggested that, based on the
their study of prostitution in Chicago, 3% of sex worker's "tricks" are freebies performed for
law enforcement in order to evade arrest. The authors conclude that "a prostitute is more
likely to have sex with a police officer than to get arrested by one." Economists Let Some
Light in on the Shady Market for Paid Sex, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2008 available at
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?storyid=10533877.
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing situation in which law
enforcement received "freebies").
52. See Kate DeCou, U.S. Social Policy on Prostitution: Whose Welfare is Served?,
24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 427, 439 (1998) (discussing the prosecution
of prostitutes and its impact on the poor and minorities).
53. Id.
54. ANDREw HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL 181 (1992). While officer misconduct is always wrong, sexual misconduct
directed towards African American women is additionally troubling in a larger systematic
context in light of the American legal system's long unequal treatment of sex crimes against
African American women. See, e.g., Jennifer Wriggens, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 106, 118 (1983) (discussing how rape of black women and men
was legal after slavery was abolished and the institutionalized sexual access to black female
slaves by white owners).
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result is linked to law enforcement's selective targeting of streetwalkers. 55
Streetwalkers, as the name implies, are the sex workers who generally
solicit business from the streets. 6 By contrast, call-girls often conduct their
business in private locations far from law enforcement presence. 57 Call-
girls are often more educated and better paid than streetwalkers. 8  In
contrast to the stereotype, streetwalkers are estimated to comprise only ten
to twenty percent of all sex workers. 59 However, streetwalkers comprise
the vast majority of arrests for prostitution.60 While law enforcement under
its broad discretion may pose legitimate explanations for this discrepancy,
the ultimate result is that "streetwalkers" will potentially have the most
sexual contact with law enforcement.61 Call-girls whose services generally
only the wealthy can afford will likely have far fewer encounters with
police officers.
iii. Undermining Public Trust
The police force risks losing its moral authority when its officers abuse
sex workers.62 This can happen in at least three ways. First, there is the
55. See DeCou, supra note 52, at 439 (linking law enforcement targeting of
streetwalkers to the disproportionate arrests rates of certain groups).
56. While each sex worker's situation is unique, observers have tried to create
different groupings of sex workers based on such factors as the location of where they work,
the identity of their clientele, the relative costs of their services, the type of remuneration
received, education level and physical appearance. Streetwalkers generally work on the
street in low-income neighborhoods and make less money than "call-girls." In a more recent
anthropological study, Elizabeth Berstein creates categories of sex workers in San Francisco
based on many of these factors. See generally, Elizabeth Bernstein, What's Wrong with
Prostitution? What's Right with Sex Work? Comparing Markets in Female Sexual Labor, 10
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 91 (1999).
57. See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L.
REv. 523, 529 (2000) (explaining the less public nature in which call-girls work as compared
to other streetwalking prostitutes).
58. Id.
59. See id. ("Although streetwalkers are the most visible and familiar, they comprise
only ten to twenty percent of all prostitutes.").
60. See id. ("[S]treetwalkers account for eighty-five to ninety percent of all
prostitution arrests."); see also Lucas, supra note 13, at 49 ("Thus, although women working
on the streets comprise a small minority of all prostitutes, they account for ninety percent of
those arrested for prostitution.").
61. This notion directly contradicts one of the touted benefits of undercover
investigations-the fact that they allow law enforcement to enforce laws against elite and
privileged members of society who are often insulated from law enforcement scrutiny.
62. See Harris, supra note 46, at 799 ("[T]he moral authority of the state is endangered
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general loss of public trust whenever there is abuse on the part of the police
department. One prosecutor echoed these sentiments when he wrote to the
county police department requesting that it cease to engage in sexual
contact with suspected sex workers. He described the behavior as carrying
"with it a certain amount of danger to the public trust in those instances
where officers 'go too far' . . .. , Second, not only is the public trust
undermined, but the police force is actually adding to the very behaviors
which they aim to cabin. There is something paternal in the role of the law
enforcement officer-the officer both protects and at times can punish in
that pursuit. Yet, if law enforcement is paternal, then conventionally,
paternal guardian and sexual partner is not an easy notion to grapple
without implying a sort of incestuous relationship.
Finally, even beyond inherent illegitimacy, the unequal enforcement of
the law is reminiscent of the discriminatory beliefs that contributed to the
creation of the law against prostitution. The underlying basis for the
criminalization and the unequal enforcement calls into question the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole. This inequality has
substantial costs: "The costs begin with the obstruction of law enforcement
but ultimately extend much further, contributing to crime and deepening
race and class divisions." 64
C. Judicial Enforcement
"A consents to sexual intercourse with B, in return for an agreed sum
of money. B gives A a counterfeit bill, knowing that A does not know that
the bill is counterfeit. B is not liable to A for battery. "65
Having laid out generally the concerns that arise from the actual
enforcement of laws criminalizing prostitution, this Part looks at the court's
role in regulating, or in this case not regulating, law enforcement conduct.
Judicial oversight is especially important because law enforcement agencies
themselves do not proactively regulate undercover operations. Instead the
agencies rely largely on the courts for legal guidelines and the creation of
by the convergence of gender violence and state power.").
63. Jason Riley & James Adams, Officers Have Sexual Contact with Sex Workers,
COURIER JOURNAL (Louiseville, Ken.), July 11, 2004 (quoting a memo by Assistant County
Prosecutor Matthew J. Golden written to the county police department in July 2002).
64. DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 169 (1999).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. g, illus. 9 (1979).
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prophylactic measures.66 For its part, the courts generally look to whether
the agency's conduct violated Due Process or whether its behavior
amounted to entrapment.67 Using this test, the courts have not found that
allowing a police officer to pose as a 'john" violates a defendant's rights.68
More specifically, when addressing the situation when the undercover
operation includes sexual contact, State courts have similarly found no legal
bar to prosecution.69
66. See Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 107, 115-16 (2005) (noting that most law enforcement agencies, except to
some extent the Department of Justice, leave regulations of undercover operations up to the
judiciary).
67. See id. at 115 n.40 (noting that, in general, defendants challenge law enforcement
conduct during undercover investigations on entrapment grounds, and to some extent on the
basis on a violation of Due Process). The most obvious potential legal bar to prosecution in
the scenario relevant in this paper is a claim of "outrageous government misconduct," or
more generally, a violation of Due Process. For example, in United States v. Russell, a case
discussing entrapment, the Court noted that, "[w]e may some day be presented with a
situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process
principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction." 411 U.S. 423, 431-42 (1973). In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495
(1976), a plurality of justices again held out the possibility that a due process challenge of
the government's outrageous conduct might bar prosecution, though the Court remained
uncertain where that line might be drawn. However, some jurisdictions do not acknowledge
the outrageous government misconduct defense. See U.S. v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th
Cir. 1995) (holding that the outrageous government misconduct defense no longer exists in
the 7th Circuit).
68. See Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Nothing is more
common in the investigation of victimless crimes such as prostitution than to pose a police
officer (or, as here, a cooperating witness) as a prostitute. Such trickery does not violate any
constitutional right of criminals."). In DeAngelo, the Court considered two § 1983 actions.
The Plaintiffs were Alexander, who was arrested for soliciting a prostitute, and his former
girlfriend, Gepfert, who police enlisted to act as an undercover prostitute. Id. at 914.
Gephert, per law enforcement's instructions performed oral sex on Plaintiff-Alexander, and
also per instructions, she spit out Alexander's semen into a napkin for law enforcement to
use as evidence. Id. at 915. The prosecution did not go forward with charges against
Plaintiff-Alexander.
69. See, e.g., State v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983, 987 (Haw. 1985) (ruling that the use of
sex by a civilian volunteer acting at the behest of a police during an investigation of a
prostitution ring was not outrageous conduct); Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957, 963
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (finding that the use of sex by an undercover officer in the
investigation of prostitution was not outrageous); State v. Putnam, 639 P.2d 858, 862-63
(Wash. Ct. App.1982) (finding that the use of sex by a civilian working with police in an
investigation of prostitution was permissible); State v. Crist, 281 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn.
1979) (finding that a plainclothes police officer did not violate due process when, in order to
gain evidence sufficient to arrest the defendant for prostitution, he exposed himself before
the defendant would negotiate a price); State v. Emerson, 517 P.2d 245, 249 (Wash. Ct. App.
1973) (finding that police conduct did not offend public policy where undercover officer
engaged in sexual intercourse with prostitutes paid by money furnished by police
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i. The Unshockable Conscience of the State Courts
State courts have on multiple occasions addressed whether or not law
enforcement during an undercover prostitution sting should be legally
barred from engaging in sexual contact. These cases are not noteworthy for
their application of any particular legal theory, but rather for what the
courts do not discuss-deeper implications that are not so easily
encapsulated in these narrow legal doctrines. Judges do not address the
rationale behind the criminalization of prostitution or the inherent
opportunities for abuse. Instead judges conclusively decide that such
conduct is simply not outrageous and does not "shock the conscience."
Municipality of Anchorage v. Flanagan70 is a good representative case.
In Flanagan an undercover police officer arranged a meeting over the
phone with a dating service that advertised in the local paper. 7 The officer
arranged to have a "body massage" at a given location. The officer met Ms.
Lynda Flanagan at that location where she reluctantly began discussing
prices for various sexual acts. The undercover officer agreed to a price for
sexual intercourse and fellatio.72 As laid out by the court, at this point Ms.
Flanagan had already committed the crime of solicitation. Any further
73
sexual contact was not necessary to complete the elements of the crime.
department). But see Shannon Colavecchio-Van Sickler, Critics: Sex Industry Stings Waste
Time, Tax Dollars, ST. PETERSBURG-TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, http://www.sptimes.com/
2004/08/08/Hillsborough/CriticsSexindustry.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2008) ("Hillsborough
Circuit Judge Debra Behnke tossed out a Hillsborough Sheriffs Office prostitution case,
saying detectives and their informant violated the woman's rights because they didn't arrest
her until after she started performing oral sex on the informant.") (on file with Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
70. See Mun. of Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957, 961 (Ala. Ct. App. 1982)
(reversing dismissal of a prostitution case on grounds of entrapment). In Flanagan, an
undercover officer performed a sting operation on a "dating service" to find whether or not
they engaged in prostitution. Id. at 959. The crime of prostitution had already been
committed when the officer continued with the transaction for some time. Id. Defendant
claimed that "[the officer]'s willingness to engage in sexual contact with Flanagan before
arresting her was unconscionable conduct, amounting to entrapment under Alaska law." Id.
The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that there was no causal link between the police
conduct and the commission of the crime. Id. at 960. Therefore, the court reversed the
lower court's decision to dismiss the charge. Id. at 963.
71. Id.at959.
72. Id.
73. This was not a case in which ambiguity existed as to whether the defendant had
agreed to a financial sum in exchange for providing sexual services. Not only was a price
agreed upon, but the undercover officer also paid for the services: "[The undercover officer]
told Flanagan that he wanted her to perform both fellatio and sexual intercourse, and he paid
her sixty dollars." Id. at 959. Anchorage Municipal criminalizes the mere solicitation to
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Despite having already witnessed Ms. Flanagan commit the elements of the
criminal offense for which she was charged, the undercover officer
nonetheless continued in the engagement with Ms. Flanagan. Next, the
officer and Ms. Flanagan both undressed.74 Ms. Flanagan gave the officer a
brief massage and then began stroking his penis. After a few seconds Ms.
Flanagan went to perform fellatio at which point the undercover officer
stopped her and arrested her for solicitation of prostitution, a misdemeanor
offense.75
Against this backdrop, the court easily disposes of the defendant's
legal challenges to the officer's conduct. Ms. Flanagan alleged: (1) that the
officer's conduct was unconscionable and therefore constituted entrapment
under Alaska law; and (2) that the officer's conduct violated Due Process.76
The Court held that the officer's behavior neither shocked the conscious nor
violated the concept of fundamental fairness. Rejecting the entrapment and
due process arguments, the Court dismissively mused that the officer's
"conduct toward Flanagan might be considered questionable" especially in
light of the fact that she would only be charged with a misdemeanor
offense.77
In another case, Hawai'i v. Tookes, 8 the Hawaiian Supreme Court
upheld prostitution convictions against two women, both of whom had sex
with a civilian undercover agent.79 In Tookes, Steven Fox, a civilian
volunteer, worked with the Honolulu Police Department Vice Squad.80 The
Police Department supplied Mr. Fox with money in order to arrange sexual
contacts with suspected sex workers.81 In addition to arranging meetings,
engage in prostitution. See A.M.C. 8.14.030(1982) ("It is unlawful for any person to
solicit... another for the purpose of prostitution or assignation." (emphasis added)).
74. Flanagan, 649 P.2d at 959.
75. Id. ("She was charged with assignation for the purpose of prostitution, a
misdemeanor under Anchorage Municipal Code.").
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Hawaii v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983, 988 (Haw. 1985) (affirming the District
Court's conviction of two women for prostitution and finding no due process violation when
a civilian agent obtained evidence for the convictions by actually engaging in sexual acts
with the defendants).
79. See id. at 985 (explaining that defendant Tookes initiated contact with the civilian
undercover agent which led to sexual intercourse and that the undercover agent arranged to
have sexual contact with defendant Tarkington after contacting her through an escort
service).
80. See id. ("Fox was a civilian volunteer who acted at the behest of members of the
Honolulu Police Department Vice Squad.").
81. See id. ("[Fox] was instructed on the law of entrapment, supplied with money to
472
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Mr. Fox was also allowed to engage in sexual contact with the suspected
sex workers in order to gather evidence for a conviction.82 In the case
before the Court, Mr. Fox had sexual intercourse with both defendants in
exchange for money. 83 Based upon their engagements with Mr. Fox, both
women were convicted of prostitution.84
Both women in the case appealed arguing that law enforcement's
conduct, in allowing a paid civilian agent to have sexual intercourse with
them as a means of obtaining evidence, violated the due process clause of
both the state and federal constitutions.8 5 In order to determine if a due
process violation occurred, the Court looked at similar cases and noted
other courts had conducted a simple balancing test of the policy
considerations-crime detection versus fair treatment.86  Here, even
weighing the treatment of the suspects against the detection of minor
misdemeanor charges, the Court upheld the validity of the law enforcement
conduct.87
The Hawaii Supreme Court's facile treatment of admittedly unethical
conduct is indicative of the judiciary's overall dismissive posture towards
the claims of sex workers. The Court did express some reservations-
acknowledging that law enforcement probably was not acting within the
ethical standards that should govern law enforcement.88 The message is
that law enforcement need not act ethically for a misdemeanor conviction to
stand. A more cynical response might be that unethical treatment during
investigations of misdemeanor crimes is acceptable if the subject is a
"prostitute."
arrange sexual contacts, and given signals by which to contact police surveillance units.")
82. See id. ("[Fox] was specifically instructed to engage in sexual intercourse if
necessary to obtain evidence sufficient for a conviction.")
83. See id. at 985 (explaining that Fox paid defendant Tarkington $100 for a massage
and sexual intercourse).
84. See id. ("Both women were convicted of prostitution as a result of acts of sexual
intercourse with Steven Fox.").
85. See id. at 986 ("In particular, Tookes asserts that the police tactics used in this case
constituted outrageous conduct in contravention of these due process guarantees.").
86. See id. at 986 ("[T]he due process "defense" involved a balancing of policy
considerations in favor of crime detection and punishment against the policy of fair
treatment." (quoting State v. Emerson, 517 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1973)).
87. See id. ("In the instant cases, the trial judges both evaluated the police practices at
issue and found no due process violation. We cannot say that their conclusions were in
error.").
88. See id. at 987 (noting also that the police "are not to be congratulated" for finding a
loophole in the ethical code).
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ii. A Dissenter Performs the Checking Function
Not all judges find prostitution cases so easy. In Minnesota v.
Thoreson,89 Judge Randall's dissent set forth a lengthy, scathing critique of
the investigatory tactics used by an undercover officer during a prostitution
sting. "If the police are going to arrest a suspected prostitute, go ahead and
make the arrest-but do not sport with her. That is all that happened
here."90 Judge Randall addresses many of the same concerns presented in
this Note.
Judge Randall asserts that removal of clothing is not an element of the
crime of prostitution.91  In light of this, the dissent then goes on to
implicitly question the motivations of the officer in requesting the suspect
continue to undress during the course of the investigation. In rather blunt
language, the Judge urges, "[t]hink about it. If [the suspect] is sitting in a
car half naked from the waist down, and [has] at least touched the money to
move it to the dashboard-if the officer does not have a case at that point,
why does a case develop after she removes her shirt and is now completely
naked? 92  As noted in Part II, given the prevalence of misconduct
surrounding this type of investigatory tactic, the judiciary should become
increasingly suspicious when an investigation seemingly begins to go too
far.
Not only does the dissent question the need for such conduct, but it
also addresses the potential underlying sexism and stereotypes that are
reinforced by allowing this type of conduct to occur. For example, the
dissent notes that "[r]espondent argues that asking a strange woman to take
off all her clothes and go naked in front of a strange man is a 'legitimate'
police tactic. Respondent argues this is so because 'good girls won't do
that but bad girls will.' ' ' 93 The assumption urged by the Respondent is that
89. See State v. Thoreson, No. A06-454, 2007 WL 1053205, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 10 2007) (affirming a misdemeanor prostitution conviction by finding that an
undercover police officer's request that a prostitution suspect remove her top was not
substantially outrageous to amount to a violation of the defendant's constitutional due
process rights).
90. See id. at *11 (Randall, J., dissenting) ("If the police are going to arrest a suspected
prostitute, go ahead and make the arrest-but do not sport with her. That is all that happened
here.").
91. See id. at *6 (citing the elements of the crime and noting that in no way is
undressing necessary to meet those elements).
92. Id. at *8 (Randall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at *9 (Randall, J., dissenting). The judge also makes an argument that in the
reverse situations-when the undercover officer is a female posing as a prostitute-the
undercover officers do not have the male counterparts strip down after money has been
474
THE GO VERNMENT MENA GE A TROIS
if the woman agrees to engage in a sexual encounter, and acts upon that,
then the officer's conduct is acceptable because she is already a "bad"
woman; therefore, no harm is done. This very logic underlies the early
justifications for criminalization of prostitution-the notion that there are
good and bad women based on their sexual practices.
The dissent's critique does not necessarily address or encapsulate the
full breadth of all the relevant concerns, but this dissent offers an example
of what a real consideration of the facts might entail. Ultimately, in this
case, the dissent concludes that the conduct is "somewhat egregious," which
does not meet the standard for dismissal under an outrageous government
misconduct doctrine. 94 However, the dissent goes on and asserts that in the
context of a crime that is not even a "somewhat egregious crime" a
"somewhat egregious" ethical violation should warrant a dismissal.95 Given
that conduct would not meet the standard required for dismissal under the
outrageous government misconduct doctrine, the dissent argues that the
case should be dismissed "under the judiciary's inherent power to dismiss a
case in the furtherance of justice. 9 6 This final call, a call to look into the
meaning of justice captures the exact debate in which the judiciary should
engage. Rather than merely looking at the law enforcement conduct in
isolation, the judiciary should look to how the government action might
undermine the legitimacy of the entire justice system.
D. Punting is Not Sufficient
Overall, the courts have generally left the regulation of undercover
prostitution investigations to the remaining branches of government.97 The
judiciary, through its reluctance to intervene, has enabled law enforcement
to effectively use this type of investigatory tactic as a means of
substantiating an arrest.98  Further, the judiciary's mere discursive
admonishments of the conduct may serve to exacerbate the potential for law
enforcement abuse in these situations. Perhaps the most damaging is that
exchanged. Id. at 11. This stripping down seems to be saved for the female sex workers.
94. Id. at *9 (Randall, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 11.
97. In Both Tookes and Flanagan, the courts do express some misgivings about the
law enforcement conduct, however, these ethical considerations carry no legal repercussions.
98. See, e.g., Tookes, 699 P.2d at 985 (validating the use of undercover police
informants to arrest individuals for prostitution).
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the judiciary's acceptance of this behavior serves in some respects as its
legitimization. The courts are telling society that it is fundamentally fair for
a law enforcement officer to engage in sexual conduct with a suspected
prostitute.
What can be drawn from the paucity of cases is the fact that the sex
workers' claims raise limited judicial responses. This limited attention is
evidence of the fact that sex workers are not deemed as equal to all others. 99
In a now oft cited maxim, the Supreme Court has resolved that "[t]he
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect."' 00 Given that the legislatures have
enacted many laws regulating or protecting sexual activity, it is a wonder
that the State's sexual conduct does not merit more consideration. Private
biases have swept into the governance of undercover prostitution stings to
the detriment of the sex worker. The sexual encounter would not so easily
pass judicial muster if the sex workers were viewed as innocent claimants,
divested from the imposition of the prostitute identity.' 0 '
III The Mnage of Government
This Part takes a holistic view of the three branches of governments'
collective response to and creation of this situation. It begins first by
considering the broader function of the government as a teacher to the
public. This Part asks whether or not the governmental actions here are
those which we expect of a teacher with moral authority. The next Part
looks at the combined overall practical effects of the governments'
collective action. The Part posits that the government has taken control
over sex worker's bodies, creating a monopoly for itself. Finally, the last
section argues that this combined governmental action reinforces the
divisive and dangerous victim/whore mythology.
99. See DeCou, supra note 52, at 439 (discussing the unequal treatment between sex
workers and other citizens).
100. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (quoting Justice Burger).
101. See DeCou, supra note 52, at 439 (highlighting the biases involved in sex worker
arrests).
THE GO VERNMENT MENAGE A TROIS
A. Government as Teacher
In one of his many famous quotes, Justice Brandeis describes the role
of the government as "the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for
ill, it teaches the whole people by its example."' 10 2 If Justice Brandeis is
right, that the government serves as a teacher and should lead by example,
then the government should be beholden to a higher standard of conduct.
As a teacher, for example, the government in allowing the conduct
described in this Note raises some serious doubts about its ability to serve
as a role-model. 0 3 The three branches of government's role in the cases
addressed in this Note call into question just what type of behavior one
expects of a teacher.
The following case illustrates just what the government accepts as a
lesson on conduct:
On July 6, 1994, an undercover police officer from the Minneapolis
Police Department entered "Nite-Lites," a reputed house of prostitution.
Oanes greeted the officer at the door, informing him the cost was $100
and he should pick the woman with whom he would like to spend a
"session." The officer selected Oanes.
Oanes brought the officer to a room with a bed and table. She suggested
he remove his clothes... [t]he officer took off his clothes and sat on the
bed. Oanes returned after approximately ten minutes and laid down on
the bed. After making small talk, Oanes asked the officer to massage
her. As he rubbed her shoulders, she raised her back and the straps of
her halter top fell over her shoulders. The officer pulled the straps down
exposing Oanes' breasts, and moved his hands over them. When the
officer asked if Oanes was going to massage him, she said she could not
and told him to finish massaging her front. The officer continued
rubbing Oanes's stomach and then unbuttoned her shorts. When the
officer asked for help in removing her clothes, Oanes lifted up her
bottom. At the officer's request, Oanes moved to the middle of the bed
and spread her legs apart. After the officer placed his hands on Oanes's
inner thighs and his face close to her vaginal area, the officer stopped
and arrested her.' 4
102. See Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928) (Brandies, J., dissenting).
103. See Gary T. Marx, Under-the-Covers Undercover Investigations: Some
Reflections on the State's Use of Sex and Deception in Law Enforcement, 11 CRIM. JUST.
ETHIcs 13, 13 (1992) ("State sponsored-deception ... also raises some issues that are unique
to the state as the symbolic repository for societal values.").
104. See State v. Oanes, 543 N.W.2d 658, 660-61, 665 (discussing the various issues
on appeal, including an entrapment defense, but ultimately upholding the conviction).
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This fact pattern laid out by the court is telling because it is written
explicitly; the court uses graphic terminology, without an indication of any
reservations about what the court is describing. As this Note urged in the
introduction, this scenario, while likely jarring for many readers, should not
simply be dismissed or reviled based on visceral responses. A more
measured analysis should take place. For this conduct to happen, the
actions of the three branches of government are required-this scenario
arose because sex work was criminalized; an officer investigated the crime;
and a judge ruled that everything was legal (except the sex work).
Yet, in taking a longer look at the scenario, one should be cautious of
jumping to conclusions. It would be easy to say that this conduct should be
banned-period. This too raises its own set of concerns. There is a sense
of paternalism in merely stating that this conduct should not happen-the
sex workers in these instances have consented to the encounter. A mere
statement that this should not occur offers an overly paternalistic
analysis.'0 5 The treatment of women as agency-less victims without choice
only serves to reinforce their subordination and undermines their legal
status. Banning the behavior overlooks the fact that the sex worker
consented to the contact. However, this argument does not, therefore, mean
that this encounter should be an accepted practice. The focus of this Note is
on whether this situation is a legitimate use of the government's authority.
Reading the details of these situations almost certainly makes the
reader uncomfortable, but this discomfort should not stop anyone,
especially judges, from taking the time to determine whether or not this
behavior serves as a legitimate lesson plan for addressing prostitution. If
the full power and arsenal of the government is befalling onto an accused,
the three branches together should act in concert not to insulate one another
from answering hard questions, but to challenge each other to find a more
perfect definition of government. Legislatures should look once more at
their laws criminalizing sex work. Law enforcement agencies should think
105. See Harris, supra note 46, at 799-800. As Harris succinctly states: "the language
of protection and security provokes a feminist suspicion that a deal with patriarchy has been
made somewhere." Id. at 799. Harris uses a quote from political theorist Wendy Brown to
describe the situation:
In the first [part], the state guarantees each man exclusive rights to his woman;
hence the familiar feminist charge that rape and adultery laws historically
represent less a concern with violations of women's personhood than with
individual men's propriety over the bodies of individual women. In the second,
the state agrees not to interfere in a man's family (de facto, a woman's life) as
long as he is presiding over it (de facto, her).
Id. at 800.
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about the culture and conduct that is prevalent. And judges should be
willing to consider what is in the interest of justice. The fact that this
conduct is happening is a failure of the three branches of government to
look at their collective conduct and ask what is their behavior is telling
society.
B. Not Just Controlling, but Using Our Bodies
"[Tihe association of the state's power with deception gives a double
meaning to the notion of being screwed. 
06
In stark contrast to the inherent checking function of the three
branches of government, the three branches instead act to insulate each
other and thereby maintain domination over the prohibited sex acts. This
Note does not simply emphasize or point to the laws underlying sexism.
107
Rather, the Note takes one step further and asserts that in this instance the
three branches of government act together to transform and enhance the
sexual domination that is inherent in the laws. In doing so, the government
has created itself into a sexual partner that acts against its own moral
code-its laws.
The justifications for the criminalization of prostitution pervert the
very enforcement of those laws. Martha Nussbaum describes feminists'
concerns over the taking of money or entering into contracts with regard to
sexual or reproductive abilities:
The social meaning of these transactions is said to be both that these
capacities are turned into objects for the use and control of men and also
that the activities themselves are being turned into commodities and
thereby robbed of the type of value they have at their best.
10 8
In a sense the government as a sexual partner during a prostitution
sting does the analogous by turning a sexual relation into a something
else-body of evidence. The enforcement of the laws criminalizing
106. Marx, supra note 10, at 16.
107. Many scholars have noted the sexism in areas of law that deal with sex and gender.
See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813 (1991). Estrich writes, "if there
is one area of social behavior where sexism is entrenched in law-one realm where
traditional male prerogatives are most protected, male power most jealously preserved, and
female power most jealously limited-it is in the area of sex itself, even forced sex." Id. at
814-15.
108. Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 695.
15 WASH. & LEE L. J. C. R. AND SOC. JUST. 453 (2009)
prostitution calls into question the integrity of the entire criminal justice
system.
C. Reinforcing Prostitute Mythology
Allowing law enforcement officers to engage in sexual contact with
suspected prostitutes places sexual contact in the same context as other
types of conduct during undercover investigations. Yet treating sexual
contact the same as other undercover operations undermines the very
justifications for the criminalization of sex work. The inconsistent
treatment of this type of sexual encounter-as both deserving protection
from the taints of commodification and treating a valid investigatory
tactic-exposes an underlying validation of the victim/whore dichotomy.'
0 9
The laws keep sex sacred, but sex from the woman who sells herself
deserves no such special privilege. ° Once the sex worker is defined as
both a victim and wanton whore, law enforcement can justify engaging in
the sexual encounter because the encounter will serve the noble purpose of
saving the sex worker, but the sanctity of her sexual activity needs no
protection because she is a whore. Mythologies and prejudices about the
identity of a sex worker have no legitimate place in the law governing the
interaction between law enforcement and suspected sex workers.
Continued adherence to this mythology and continual disparate treatment
and respect of peoples' bodies calls into question the ability of the three-
part government to adhere to its promise to deliver justice.
109. Prejudices amongst the classes and races may serve as the basis of the creation of
these two opposing identities. See Ann M. Lucas, supra note 13, at 57-58. Lucas states:
Those who viewed prostitutes as victims of male seduction and guile typically
portrayed such women as "white, native born, and middle-class in... manners
and attitudes if not... background" and also "young, rural, and innocent."
Those who blamed prostitutes for their depravity tended to picture working-class
women, usually non-white and/or immigrant, with deficient personal and
cultural habits and characteristics.
Id. (citations omitted).
110. This sentiment is echoed in the dissent referenced in Part III.B. See State v.
Thoreson, 2007 WL 1053205 at *9 (Minn. App. 2007) ("Respondent argues that asking a
strange woman to take off all her clothes and go naked in front of a strange man is a
'legitimate' police tactic. Respondent argues this is so because 'good girls won't do that but
bad girls will."').
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IV. Conclusion
The Operalization of Prostitution:
Who Pays When the Government Inserts the Sexual Arm of the Law?
Legal scholars have produced a massive volume of academic literature
addressing sex work, largely focusing on the validity of the justifications
supporting or rejecting its criminalization. These debates have focused
predominantly on either the State's role in regulating morality, the nature of
the sexual relation or the personhood of the sex worker. These debates
have largely overlooked the means by which the State actually enforces or
investigates prostitution. This Note shows that this discussion is very much
needed because in fact the means of the investigation may very well create
an immunized governmental agent who has a monopoly on legal sexual
contact with suspected sex workers.'
An analysis of the power differentials and agency issues, while
informative, cannot provide a completely satisfactory response to the
concerns over the legitimacy of the investigatory tactic. Neither a total ban
nor complete acceptance of the interaction will result in a perfect situation.
The prohibition of sexual contact during prostitution stings will treat sex
workers as exceptions to the generalized laissez-faire regulation of
undercover investigations. This treatment will reinforce the victim
stereotype and undermine the overall autonomy of the sex worker.
Reinforcement of either disempowers the sex worker. Not only is she not
allowed to legally commoditize her sexual favors, but also even her consent
to be touched may be overridden. This further alienation of free will
unnecessarily demotes the sex worker to a minor who is per se unable to
engage in sexual activities.
However, while prohibiting sexual contact disempowers the sex
worker, the converse serves an illusory empowerment. In this case the
sexual contact is only valid because a court ordains it so. The law prohibits
sex workers from engaging in prostitution-preventing them from legally
engaging in certain forms of sexual conduct. Yet if the government is the
partner the conduct is only illegal on her part. Only the government can be
her legal sex partner in commercial transactions. Other potential partners
are legally forbidden to touch her. The sexual activity on the part of law
111. See Harris, supra note 46, at 794. Harris argues that police officers have a
monopoly over violence and moral authority. Id. This Note argues that the situation may be
similar with the police also having a monopoly over sexual activity with sex workers.
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enforcement is only valid because a court has distinguished it from
participation in prostitution.
Allowing sexual contact may validate the sex worker's right to choose
to engage in illegal conduct and accordingly to suffer equally the same
punishment as all others who commit a crime. This validation, however,
comes at the price of undermining the government's criminalization of
prostitution. The government's acceptance of and participation in this
investigatory tactic traps the sex worker in a detrimental mythology in
which she cannot escape. It is time for the law to recognize "who she is" by
no longer conflating her with her occupation. 1 2  If sex is market
inalienable, then surely dominion over that sexual activity should rest with
the actor and not within governmental coffers of evidentiary material. A
system that merely checks one branch and does not embrace a holistic view
of its entities cannot provide a just government.
112. See Sylvia A. Law, supra note 57, at 525 ("Further, the term 'prostitute' conflates
work and identity. Women who sell sex for money typically have other identities, that is,
daughter, mother, athlete, musician, et cetera."). Further, sex workers' identities and
experiences vary remarkably precluding the validity of simple generalization or
essentialization. See Elizabeth Bernstein, What's Wrong with Prostitution? What's Right
with Sex Work? Comparing Markets in Female Sexual Labor, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J.
91, 102 (1999) ("[Pjrostitutes have a diverse range of experiences... even within a ten-
block radius of one city.").
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